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I. INTRODUCTION 
“I figured if I didn’t understand it, and I had access to a couple 
hundred Ph.D.s, how the rest of the world is going to understand it 
sort of bewilders me.”1 
 
Since 2006, plaintiffs have initiated more than eight hundred 
subprime-related lawsuits.2 As of December 30, 2008, plaintiff-investors 
filed two hundred and ten federal securities class actions alleging over 
$856 billion in losses.3 The Second Circuit outpaced all other circuits 
with 92 filings, followed by the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, with 28 and 
17 respectively.4 The wave of securities litigation flows from the over-
issuance of subprime mortgage loans, the subsequent bundling of those 
high-risk loans, and large-scale Wall Street investment in mortgage-
backed securities.5 The dramatic decline in home values led to a surge in 
homeowner mortgage default, revealing the true risks embedded in 
mortgage-backed securities.6 Some economists find fault only in the 
inevitability of a recession, where other prominent scholars simply view 
                                                                                                             
 1 House of Cards (CNBC television broadcast Mar. 29, 2009) (Allen Greenspan, 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve from 1987 until 2006, admitting his trouble 
understanding some of the complexities associated with the structured financial products 
at the heart of the financial crisis) (transcript available at http://voogle.mreplay.com/ 
transcript/House_of_Cards/58/CNBC/Sunday_March_1_2009/03_01_09/0/). 
 2 Monica Pinciak-Madden & Katya Jestin, Subprime Crisis: The Unraveling 
Promises to Increase the Number of Civil Suits and Criminal Investigations, N. Y. L. J., 
January 5, 2009, at 1, available at http://jenner.com/people/bio.asp?id=989 (scroll down 
to “available publications”; then follow “please click here to review article” hyperlink). 
 3 See Securities Class Action Filings, 2008: A Year in Review, Stanford Law School 
Securities Class Action Clearing House & Cornerstone Research, (Jan. 6, 2009), 
available at http://securities.stanford.edu (follow “full report” hyperlink under 
“Clearinghouse Research”). 
 4 Id. at 3. 
 5 See Sally Pittman, ARMS, but no Legs to Stand On: “Subprime” Solutions Plague 
the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 40 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1089 (2008) for an analysis of the 
leading factors contributing to the subprime mortgage crisis.; see also Betty Simkins & 
Steven A. Ramirez, Enterprise-Wide Risk Management and Corporate Governance, 39 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 571, 590–91 (2008) (“Specifically, rising defaults in the subprime 
mortgage market caused world capital markets to seize up and the largest financial 
institutions in the world to suffer impaired liquidity and decreased capital.”). 
 6 See Simkins, supra note 5, at 590 (“The uncertainty of the magnitude of subprime 
losses and the lack of transparency regarding which firms held the risk evolved to foment 
a full-fledged credit crunch and liquidity crisis in the financial sector.”). 
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the crisis as the result of corporate greed and lax regulatory standards.7 
Wall Street rooted its risk exposure in the global financial markets and 
now investors and the public alike must ask whether it could have been 
prevented.8 Suspecting that corporate executives concealed or 
understated the quality and risk associated with the mortgages backing 
these securities, investors have filed claims seeking relief under U.S. 
securities laws.9 
Although private securities class actions provide for investor 
scrutiny and serve as an important deterrent to fraudulent activity,10 
securities class actions receive less than favorable treatment in the 
federal courts pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995 (“PSLRA”).11 Specifically, the PSLRA mandates a stay of all 
discovery pending a motion to dismiss, which consequentially limits a 
plaintiff’s ability to sufficiently demonstrate fraudulent intent at the 
pleading stage.12 The costs and complexities of securities litigation 
undoubtedly burden defendant corporations; however, the PSLRA places 
                                                                                                             
 7 Id. at 591 (citing Secretary Paulson’s warning of market “stress and volatility in 
early 2008” and suggesting that the  “structured investment vehicles” holding credit risk 
in subprime mortgages were not disclosed on company balance sheets). 
 8 The FDIC closed 42 U.S. banks since March 7, 2008. FDIC.gov, Failed Bank List, 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2008); see 
also Aaron Unterman, Innovative Destruction - Structured Finance and Credit Market 
Reform in the Bubble Era, 5 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 53, 56 (2009) (“As of August 2008, over 
$500-billion in losses have been reported, primarily by major international banks.”); see 
also Randall Dodd & Paul Mills, Outbreak: US Subprime Contagion, International 
Monetary Fund - Finance & Development, Vol. 45, Sec. 2 (June 2008), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2008/06/dodd.htm (“Like an epidemic . . . the 
financial crisis spread when losses to intermediaries in one nontransparent market raised 
concerns about liquidity and solvency elsewhere.”). 
 9 The Securities Exchange of 1934, specifically the anti-fraud provisions located in 
section 10(b) and the regulations thereunder, provides for a private cause of action for 
securities fraud and insider trading. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.S § 78j(b) 
(2009) (This section proscribes the “use or employ, in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
contravention of such rules and regulations.”). 
 10 See Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the 
Effect of the PSLRA’s Internal-Information Standard on ‘33 and ‘34 Act Claims, 76 
WASH. U. L. Q. 537, 592–93 (1998) (arguing that Congress intended the Securities Act of 
‘33 to “act as the incentive for a company to adhere to its disclosure obligations” and 
“subject public offerings, and thereby the companies, officers, and directors making 
them, to investor scrutiny.”). 
 11 Patrick Hall, The Plight of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in the Post-
Enron Era: The Ninth Circuit’s Interpretation of Materiality in Employer-Teamster v. 
America West, 2004 B.Y.U.L. REV. 863, 873 (2004) (“With the stated purpose of 
deterring frivolous securities fraud claims, the PSLRA heightens the pleading 
requirements for private litigants by requiring that a complaint plead with particularity 
both falsity and scienter.”). 
 12 Id. 
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an equally insurmountable burden on plaintiffs to prove securities fraud 
in its entirety at the pleading stage.13 The extraordinarily complex nature 
of mortgage-backed securities, coupled with the PSLRA discovery stay, 
often leaves plaintiffs with insufficient pre-filing hard evidence to satisfy 
a heightened pleading standard.14 
As the new wave of subprime-related litigation takes aim at 
financial institutions,15 this comment seeks to address the inequity of the 
federal courts’ application of the PSLRA’s heightened pleading standard 
in the context of exotic, mortgage-backed securities. As a proposed 
solution, plaintiffs should be required to plead particularly those facts 
available to them prior to discovery that evince fraudulent intent on the 
part of the defendants. To prevail on a motion to dismiss, the defendant 
corporations should then bear the burden of rebutting qualified 
allegations of fraudulent intent or suffer the pangs of discovery. This 
comment argues that in the context of mortgage-backed securities, the 
PSLRA policy of deterring frivolous claims must give way to the 
overarching goals of securities regulation. 
Part II of this Comment will address the background of U.S. 
securities laws and the specific PSLRA pleading requirements. Part III 
will address the circuit courts’ interpretation of the PSLRA and the 
Supreme Court’s recent interpretation of the ‘scienter’ requirement. Part 
IV argues that in the unique context of mortgage-backed securities, the 
current financial crisis calls for the relaxation of the PSLRA pleading 
requirements. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. U.S. Securities Laws: Policy & History 
The stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression that 
followed prompted Congress to pass regulatory legislation to provide for 
government oversight in the market of securities transactions.16 Prior to 
                                                                                                             
 13 See Sale, supra note 10, at 564 (arguing that the PSLRA is over-inclusive in 
eliminating securities class actions because “the Reform Act is likely to allow only the 
more flagrant and obvious cases of securities fraud to proceed past a motion to dismiss.”). 
 14 See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Using State Inspection Statutes For 
Discovery in Federal Securities Fraud Actions, 77 B.U.L. REV. 69, 71 (1997) (“[O]nly in 
the unusual circumstances where the defendants have disclosed facts in their own federal 
securities filings . . . would information sufficient to satisfy the pleading standard become 
publicly available.”). 
 15 See Securities Class Action Filings, supra note 3, at 2 (stating that almost half of 
all filings in 2008 involved the financial services sector). 
 16 See JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES 
REGULATION 5 (5th ed. 2006). 
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the crash, many investors borrowed money to purchase over-valued, 
highly speculative securities.17 When stock prices dropped, panic ensued 
and massive margin calls triggered a market-wide sell-off of securities 
and a nationwide “run on the bank.”18 This “speculative driven stock 
market boom of the 1920s” stemmed primarily from the lack of 
regulatory presence, low transaction costs for market participation, and 
low interest rates.19 In 1934, there existed a public consensus that the 
crash was caused by excessive market speculation and Congress 
responded by enacting securities regulations as an effort to thwart 
another financial meltdown.20 
Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 to regulate public 
stock offerings and mandate specific disclosures prior to an initial public 
offering.21 Congress enacted the Securities Act with the fundamental 
purpose of replacing the caveat emptor approach to securities purchases 
with one of full disclosure.22 Complimentary to the Securities Act, 
Congress enacted the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to regulate 
the secondary market of securities transactions and created the Securities 
and Exchange Commission as the agency responsible for enforcement.23 
The Exchange Act seeks to promote the overall integrity of the U.S. 
capital markets by providing anti-fraud provisions and implementing 
regulatory controls over brokers and dealers in the secondary markets.24 
                                                                                                             
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. The term, “run on the bank,” signifies a large-scale withdraw of bank deposits 
at the same time, forcing the bank into a severe and often fatal liquidity crisis. Mark E. 
Van Der Weide & Satish M. Kini, Subordinated Debt: A Capital Markets Approach to 
Bank Regulation, 41 B.C. L. REV. 195 (2000). For a detailed discussion of the bank 
panics of the Great Depression, see ELMUS WICKER, THE BANKING PANICS OF THE GREAT 
DEPRESSION 1 (2000) (stating that the 9,096 banks closed between 1930 and 1933). 
 19 Steven A. Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics of the New Deal at 70, 62 MD. 
L. REV. 515, 517 (2003) (The boom of the 1920s was driven by “an efficient environment 
including low transaction costs and the ability to negotiate for information” and thereafter 
“the market devolved into a speculative bubble.”). 
 20 Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 409 (1990). 
 21 Cox, supra note 16, at 3; see also The Law That Governs the Security Industry – 
Securities Act of 1933, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (often referred to as the “truth in securities” law). 
 22 See Cox, supra note 16, at 3 (summarizing that the prevailing view was that 
“Congress intended the Exchange Act to fill that role” and the Act’s fundamental purpose 
was ‘“to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat 
emptor.”’). 
 23 Id. at 7; see also The Law That Governs the Security Industry, supra note 21 (The 
Act created and empowered the Securities and Exchange commission with the “power to 
register, regulate, and oversee brokerage firms, transfer agents, and clearing agencies as 
well as the nation’s securities self regulatory organizations.”). 
 24 See Cox, supra note 16, at 9. 
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Government enforcement of the mandatory disclosure and antifraud 
provisions of U.S. securities laws serves to prevent the systemic risks 
that cause financial markets to collapse.25 The current financial crisis best 
exemplifies the far-reaching externalities of systemic or institutional-
wide financial risk.26 The principle justification for regulating this risk is 
market efficiency, wherein market failures can be corrected and crippling 
externalities can be prevented.27 
The Securities Act and the Exchange Act provide plaintiffs with 
numerous express and implied causes of action;28 however, the Exchange 
Act’s general fraud liability provision of Rule 10b-5 stands alone as the 
most prominent.29 The basic elements of this private right of action 
include: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission made by the 
defendant; (2) such misstatements or omissions were made with scienter; 
(3) in connection with a purchase or sale of security; (4) reliance on the 
material misstatement or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) a causal 
connection between the misstatement or omission and the economic 
loss.30  Further, Federal Civil Rule of Procedure 9 mandates that claims 
of fraud be pleaded with particularity, but that intent “may be averred 
                                                                                                             
 25 See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR 240.10b-5 (2009) 
(it is unlawful “to make an untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary . . . in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading . . . .”); see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 
(2008) (defining systemic risk as “risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or 
institutional failure triggers (through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a chain 
of markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to financial institutions, (ii) 
resulting in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its availability, often evidenced 
by substantial financial-market price volatility.”). 
 26 See Schwarcz, supra note 25, at 199 (noting that financial institutions and banks 
are important sources of capital and “their failure, especially in large numbers, can 
deprive society of capital and increase its cost.”). 
 27 Id. at 206 (stating that “[f]ailures of the financial system can generate social costs 
in the form of widespread poverty and unemployment, which in turn can destroy lives 
and foster crime.”). 
 28 See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005); see also Sale, supra 
note 10, at n.7, for a summary of the eight express and four implied causes of action 
under the Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities Act of 1933. 
 29 Id. at n.12. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act prohibits the “use or 
employ[ment] . . . of any . . . deceptive device . . . in connection with the purchase or sale 
of any security” and “in contravention of” Securities and Exchange Commission “rules 
and regulations.” 15 U.S.C.S. § 78j(b). Thereunder, the SEC enacted Rule 10b-5 which 
prohibits issuers from making “untrue statement of a material fact” or an omission of a 
material fact “necessary in order to make the statements made . . . not misleading.” 17 
CFR § 240.10b-5 (2004). 
 30 Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005). Scienter is defined as 
a defendant’s “intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 
425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976). 
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generally.”31 Prior to the PSLRA, the federal courts imposed varying 
standards of the particularity required when alleging securities fraud and 
in an effort to both heighten and unify the gate-keeping role of the 
pleading stage, Congress enacted the PSLRA.32 
B. The Enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(“PSLRA”) to amend the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934.33 Among the many changes,34 the PSLRA most 
notably created an unprecedented pleading standard in securities fraud 
class actions under section 10(b)-5 of the Exchange Act.35 Securities 
class action plaintiffs alleging securities fraud must specifically identify 
each of the defendant’s statements alleged to be misleading or false and 
explain in what way those statements were misleading or false.36 The 
PSLRA “scienter” provision further requires plaintiffs to plead specific 
and particularized facts that give rise to a strong inference that the 
                                                                                                             
 31 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). This pleading standard enhances the traditional notice 
pleading required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 that requires plaintiffs plead only 
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that [they are] entitled to relief.” FED. 
R. CIV. P. 8. 
 32 See Sale, supra note 10, at 544. 
 33 See generally Andre Douglas Pond Cummings, “Ain’t No Glory in Pain”: How 
the 1994 Republican Revolution and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
Contributed to the Collapse of the United States Capital Markets 83 NEB. L. REV. 979, 
1007 (2005) (stating that the express purpose of Securities Act of ‘33 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of ‘34 was to “strike a delicate balance between investor protection and 
enhancement of capital formation by U.S. corporations.”). 
 34 James, D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas, & Lynn Bai, There Are Plaintiffs and . . . 
There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Action Settlements, 2 
VAND. L. REV. 355 (2008) (The PSLRA introduced (1) “a heightened pleading 
requirement”; (2) “procedures by which the court chooses a lead plaintiff for the class . . . 
the petitioner with the largest financial loss suffered”; (3) “a bar to the plaintiff from 
obtaining any discovery prior to . . . disposing of the defendants’ motions to dismiss”; (4) 
“joint and several liability was replaced with proportionate liability”; and (5) 
“contribution rights among co-violators are also based on the proportionate fault of each 
defendant.”). 
 35 The general consensus among commentators is that the PSLRA represented a 
paradigm shift with respect to the burden of proof in securities litigation. See, e.g., Cox 
supra note 34, at 357 (noting that “the PSLRA cast aside—albeit only for securities 
actions—the less demanding notice pleading requirement that has been a fixture of U.S. 
civil procedure for decades.”). 
 36 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2504 
(2007) (hereinafter cited to the Supreme Court Reporter, 127 S. Ct. 2499) (stating that the 
PSLRA “requires plaintiffs to state with particularity both the facts constituting the 
alleged violation, and the facts evidencing scienter, i.e., the defendant’s intention ‘to 
deceive, manipulate, or defraud.’”). 
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defendant acted with intent to defraud.37 Additionally, upon a 
defendant’s motion to dismiss, the PSLRA mandates a stay of discovery 
until the court rules on the pending motion.38 In short, the PSLRA 
requires plaintiffs to plead facts establishing a strong inference that the 
defendants acted with intent to defraud without the benefit of ordinary 
discovery practices.39 In most cases, plaintiffs are limited to the 
defendants’ public disclosures in federal securities filings or available 
revelations in ongoing federal investigations.40 
Congress enacted the PSLRA in an effort to deter abusive private 
securities litigation by weeding out meritless claims prior to the initiation 
of expensive and time consuming discovery.41 Proponents of the PSLRA 
asserted that the burdensome and expensive discovery associated with 
securities class actions served to extort settlements from corporate 
defendants.42 Thus, the heightened pleading standard forces plaintiffs to 
prove the merits of their securities fraud claim prior to the defendants 
incurring substantial discovery expenses.43 In short, Congress heightened 
the pleading standard in securities fraud class actions with the 
assumption that abusive discovery practices, pursuant to frivolous 
claims, unfairly extorted settlements from corporate defendants.44 
                                                                                                             
 37 Id. (holding that “plaintiffs must ‘state with particularity facts giving rise to a 
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.’”); see id. at 
2509 (“The ‘strong inference’ standard ‘unequivocally raise[d] the bar for pleading 
scienter.’”). 
 38 See Joel Seligman, The Seventeenth Annual Corporate Law Symposium: 
Rethinking Private Securities Litigation, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 117 (2004) (explaining 
the PSLRA mandatory stay of discovery requires “all discovery and other proceedings 
shall be stayed during the pendency of a motion to dismiss” and that “[t]here have been 
relatively few exceptions to the stay provision.”). 
 39 See generally Cummings, supra note 33 (arguing that the PSLRA automatic stay 
of discovery provision acts to hamper victims of alleged securities fraud). 
 40 Thomas, supra note 14, at 71. 
 41 Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives For 
Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U.L. REV. 91, 92 
(2007) (“Congress recognized that something was broken in the private securities 
litigation arena.”); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2504 
(2007) (“As a check against abusive litigation in private securities fraud actions, the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) includes exacting pleading 
requirements.”). 
 42 See Christine Hurt, The Undercivilization of Corporate Law, 33 IOWA J. CORP. L. 
361, 385–87 (2008) (stating the enactment of the PSLRA primarily stemmed from a 
desire to end “strike suits” or abusive litigation). 
 43 John M. Wunderlich, Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.: The Weighing 
Game, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 613, 654–55 (2008) (noting that Congress passed the PSLRA 
to prevent strike suits where high litigation and discovery costs forced parties into settling 
claim). 
 44 Id. 
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The PSLRA’s heightened pleading requirements and policy goals 
immediately faced criticism.45 In fact, the House and the Senate overrode 
President Clinton’s veto of the PSLRA in 1995.46  President Clinton 
found that the heightened “state of mind” provision “impose[d] an 
unacceptable procedural hurdle to meritorious claims.”47 Also, many 
argued that the PSLRA enabled the dismissal of meritorious investor 
complaints against corporations that contributed to the Enron-era 
scandals of the early 21st century.48 Congress enacted the PSLRA to 
address a narrow class of unmeritorious securities claims; however, this 
“kitchen sink” amendment creates a barrier, which in some 
circumstances, results in the dismissal of both meritorious and 
unmeritorious claims.49 Congress enacted the PSLRA to deter frivolous 
claims, but limited all injured plaintiffs, in every context, to the same 
blanket discovery stay. Consequently, the discovery stay prevents 
plaintiffs from gaining access to the strong evidence necessary to survive 
a motion to dismiss.50 
III. APPLICATION OF THE PSLRA – PROVING SCIENTER AT THE 
PLEADING STAGE 
A. The Circuit Split and Tellabs 
After the enactment of the PSLRA, the circuit courts struggled to 
define the requisite level of intent necessary to plead a “strong inference” 
of scienter and three divergent approaches emerged.51 The Second 
                                                                                                             
 45 See Cummings, supra note 33, at 1007 (2005) (“Congress passed the PSLRA in 
1995 amid much dissension, spectacle, explicit warning, and ceremony and over a 
Presidential Veto.”); Cf. Seligman, supra note 38, at 96 (discussing the four primary 
arguments for the enactment of the PSLRA). 
 46 See Seligman, supra note 38, at 105 (stating the PSLRA represents the first time a 
veto by President Clinton had been overridden). 
 47 Presidential Veto Message on the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 141 
CONG. REC. S. 19034 (Dec. 21, 1995). 
 48 Enron created hybrid of subsidiary corporations, partnerships, and energy based 
derivatives enabling it to deceive investors and employees, “to the tune of billions of 
dollars of nonexistent value.” Cummings, supra note 33, at 1045; see also Seligman, 
supra note 38, at 113 (“[T]he diminution in the effectiveness of private federal securities 
litigation was one of several factors that contributed to a reduction in fraud deterrence.”). 
 49 See Seligman, supra note 38, at 117 (“The 1995 Act is a type of ‘kitchen sink’ 
legislation consisting of idea after idea piled upon one another to address an apparent 
problem with a disproportionate response.”). 
 50 Robert S. Greenberger, Questioning the Books: Panel, in Enron’s Wake, to Review 
Lawsuit Curbs, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2002, at A8 (quoting Columbia University law 
professor, Jack Coffee) (“You can’t get discovery unless you have strong evidence of 
fraud, and you can’t get strong evidence of fraud without discovery.”). 
 51 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2509 (2007) (stating 
that “[w]ith no clear guide from Congress . . . Courts of Appeals have diverged again, this 
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Circuit adopted the most liberal standard, requiring plaintiffs to plead 
sufficient circumstantial evidence of recklessness or conscious behavior 
that would give rise to a strong inference of scienter.52 The Ninth Circuit 
adopted the most restrictive standard, wherein plaintiffs needed to 
specifically identify fraudulent statements, the speaker of those 
statements, and explain why those statements were misleading or false.53 
Finally, the circuits adopting an intermediary position utilized a “totality 
of the pleadings” approach, holding that allegations of motive and 
opportunity or recklessness could create a strong inference of scienter. 54 
Those courts adopted a case-by-case, fact sensitive approach to the 
evaluation scienter.55  
In 2007, the Supreme Court sought to clarify the scienter issue in 
Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights.56 The Court interpreted the “strong 
inference” requirement of the PSLRA such that the strength of the 
inference must be a powerful or compelling one or “strong in light of 
other explanations.”57 The Court interpreted a “strong” inference as one 
that is “at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent 
intent.”58 As such, the federal courts must engage in a comparative 
inquiry to determine whether plaintiffs have met their burden.59 
                                                                                                             
time in construing the term ‘strong inference.’”); see generally Daniela Nanau, Analyzing 
Post-Market Boom Jurisprudence in the Second and Ninth Circuits: Has the Pendulum 
Really Swung Too Far In Favor of Plaintiffs?, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 943, 
966 (2006). 
 52 See Nanau, supra note 51, at 967–68. 
 53 Id. at 968; see In re Silicon Graphics, Inc., Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 
1999) (The Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the Second Circuit’s “motive and 
opportunity” standard and instituted the requirement that plaintiffs “plead, in great detail, 
facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of deliberately reckless or conscious 
misconduct.”). 
 54 See Nanau, supra note 51, at 968 (finding that the First, Sixth, and Eleventh 
Circuit adopted some version of the “totality of the pleadings” approach). 
 55 Id. at 969 (“These circuit courts reason that while the Reform Act heightened the 
pleading standard of scienter, it did not redefine scienter to exclude recklessness and limit 
liability to misrepresentations made with intent.”). 
 56 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007). 
 57 Id. at 2511 (“In sum, the reviewing court must ask: When the allegations are 
accepted as true and taken collectively, would a reasonable person deem the inference of 
scienter at least as strong as any opposing inference?”). 
 58 Id. at 2510 (holding that “a court must consider plausible, nonculpable 
explanations for the defendant’s conduct, as well as inferences favoring the plaintiff.”). 
 59 See The Supreme Court, 2006 Term: Leading Case: Federal Statutes and 
Regulations—Private Securities Litigation Reform Act—“Strong Inference” Pleading 
Standard, 121 HARV. L. REV. 385, 387–88 (2007) for a discussion of whether the 
Supreme Court meant “collective comparison” of inferences or “individual comparison.” 
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Putting aside the Seventh Amendment implications of permitting 
judges to make factual determinations at the pleading stage,60 the 
requirement to plead fraudulent intent “with particularity” reflects the 
crux of the inequity of the PSLRA as applied to mortgage-backed 
securities.61 The PSLRA unfairly raises the plaintiff’s burden to prove 
fraudulent intent when certain facts are only within the purview of the 
defendants.62 Plaintiffs seeking relief for fraudulent or inadequate 
disclosure in the context of mortgage-backed securities require a 
reasonable degree of discovery in order to meet the PSLRA’s burden of 
particularity.63 
The high stakes of the current financial crisis illustrate the need for 
corporate defendants to share the burden of proof with investor-plaintiffs 
at the pleading stage. Recall that the Supreme Court requires a 
comparative inquiry of both fraudulent and nonfraudulent inferences 
derived from the pleadings.64 In the arena of mortgage-backed securities, 
the sudden demise of the housing market presents a formidable 
competing inference for plaintiffs to overcome.65 The current financial 
context and the complexities of the subprime mortgage market provide 
corporate defendants with a competing inference that requires little 
substantiation. 
B. The Post-PSLRA Stock Market Collapse of 2002 
The current financial crisis ominously mirrors the market crash of 
2002, in which large-scale corporate deception flattened U.S. stocks and 
investor confidence.66 Prior to the 2002 market crash, federal courts 
dismissed investors’ claims alleging securities fraud against entities such 
                                                                                                             
 60 See Suja A. Thomas, The PSLRA’S Seventh Amendment Problem (Univ. of 
Cincinnati College of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 
07-03), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=968893, at 6 (stating that the enactment of 
the PSLRA impinges on the right to a jury trial because it sought “to fashion a remedy 
that focuses on the cause of action, not class actions . . . .”). 
 61 See Seligman, supra note 38, at 119 (“The bar has been raised unequivocally with 
the actual knowledge standard.”). 
 62 K-Tel Int’l Sec. Litig. v. K-Tel Int’l., 300 F.3d 881, 900 (8th Cir. 2002) (Murphy, 
dissenting) (“Many relevant facts in securities cases may not be discoverable at the 
pleading stage because they are known only by key insiders.”). 
 63 See Seligman, supra note 38, at 119 (“[T]he plaintiff should be given, in 
appropriate circumstances, the right to develop a case through discovery.”); see also infra 
Part IV. 
 64 Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2505. 
 65 See, e.g., Tripp v. IndyMac Bancorp, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95445 (C.D. 
Cal. Nov. 29, 2007) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim, finding the likelihood that the 
defendants simply did not shield themselves from the drastic change in the housing 
market to be the strongest inference). 
 66 See Cummings, supra note 33, at 1033. 
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as WorldCom, Tyco, Arthur Anderson and Deloitte & Touche.67 This 
historical precedent raises the question of whether the practical effects of 
the PSRLA actually benefit investors in the long run.68 Having uniformly 
heightened the pleading standard, no matter the context, the PSLRA 
serves, not to deter malfeasance, but instead, promotes the creation of 
complicated, structured finance in which fraudulent practices cannot be 
fettered out before discovery.69 When securities class actions become 
less of a force, fraud deterrence deteriorates and injured investors are left 
at the mercy of the unpredictable and often under-funded enforcement 
powers of the SEC.70 Effective SEC deterrence, however, cannot be 
relied upon as the only mechanism of enforcement.71 
The intense wake of the current financial crisis must serve as a 
reminder of the enormous dependence this country has on the integrity of 
Wall Street.72 No other time in American history reflects the 
“inextricable tie” between the financial security of millions of Americans 
and the U.S. capital markets.73 The recent corporate “bailout”74 further 
                                                                                                             
 67 WorldCom misstated over $ 3.8 billion of expenses, claiming large profit margins 
when the company was in reality, hemorrhaging money. Id. at 1031 (“[T]he deceit by 
WorldCom, Tyco, and Arthur Andersen was alleged far earlier than the eventual collapse 
date of each, under the heightened pleading standards of the PSLRA.”). 
 68 Id. at 1037 (arguing that PSLRA acts to “save consumers nothing, protect white-
collar criminals and add to the burden of the victims of fraud.”). 
 69 “Impact of Private Securities Litigation,” Hot Securities Litigation Issues in a 
Down Economy (MCLE, Inc.) (2002) p. 185 (presented November 7, 2002) (arguing the 
overall ineffectiveness of the PSLRA in deterring fraud). 
 70 The SEC also lacks the human capital necessary to recognize complex and 
innovative fraudulent schemes. See, e.g., Arthur Levitt, How the SEC Can Prevent More 
Madoffs, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article 
/SB123111989471152931.html (stating that “[o]ver the past few years, the SEC has not 
kept pace with inflation or innovation.”); see also Restoring America’s Trust in 
America’s Business, Sloan Project on Bus. Institutions at the Georgetown Univ. L. Center 
(November 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=784526 (conference proceedings for Panel 5) (noting the inadequacies of SEC 
enforcement and the costly and burdensome nature of strengthening the SEC). 
 71 See Restoring American’s Trust, supra note 70, at 88 (Mr. Wallison) (“My 
complaint is that we have criminal and civil laws that deal with these kinds of 
breakdowns that have occurred here.”). 
 72 Steven L. Schwarcz, Markets, Systemic Risk, and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 
61 SMU L. REV. 209, 210 (2008) (“[T]he subprime mortgage crisis - can trigger a chain 
of market and/or financial institution failures, resulting in increases in the cost of capital 
or decreases in its availability.”). 
 73 Nanau, supra note 51, at 975 (emphasizing the importance of acute enforcement of 
securities laws given the profile of today’s stockholders). 
 74 On February 17, 2009, President Barack Obama signed into law a $787 billion 
economic stimulus package with the stated purpose of “[m]aking supplemental 
appropriations for job preservation and creation, infrastructure investment, energy 
efficiency and science, assistance to the unemployed, and State and local fiscal 
stabilization, for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2009, and for other purposes.” 
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reduces any corporate incentive to provide investors with adequate and 
ongoing disclosure in the context of new and complex financial 
instruments.75 The federal courts should implement the proposed 
pleading standard to strike a balance between protecting innocent market 
participants and deterring fraud in this innovative financial arena.76 
The PSLRA embodies important policy goals, and rather than 
suggest its repeal, courts should exercise flexibility in determining the 
sufficiency of a pleading. In light of the current financial crisis, the 
PSLRA must not function solely to reduce the sheer number of securities 
claims, but must be implemented in a manner that preserves meritorious 
actions.77 Since the enactment of the PSLRA, the Supreme Court has 
refined the metes and bounds of its pleading requirements, but has not 
foreclosed the federal courts from broadening the scope of their pleading 
analyses.78 Although the Tellabs ruling sought to clarify the requisite 
                                                                                                             
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, H.R. 1, 111th Cong. (2009). The bill 
is highly contentious because although it seeks to stimulate the economy, the package 
arguably provides financial support to the same corporations that are responsible for the 
crisis. See, e.g., David Brooks, Money For Idiots, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2009, at A31 
(“The Bush and Obama administrations have compensated foolishness and 
irresponsibility. The financial bailouts reward bankers who took insane risks. The auto 
bailouts subsidize companies and unions that made self-indulgent decisions a few 
decades ago that drove their industry into the ground.”). 
 75 See Aaron Unterman, Innovative Destruction - Structured Finance and Credit 
Market Reform in the Bubble Era, 5 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 53, 81 (2009) (stating that 
“[g]overnment bailouts stand in stark opposition to the ideals of the market system” and 
by “[a]llowing major institutions to profit from irresponsible financial dealings and then 
intervening when they get in over their heads makes it too easy for these firms to avoid 
the consequences of their actions.”). 
 76 Id. at 75 (urging courts to strike a balance ensuring “that the worst investor abuses 
come to light.”). 
 77 Wunderlich, supra note 43, at 651 (“One of the primary problems with the Tellabs 
decision is its preoccupation with frivolous strike suits and excessive discovery costs . . .  
[the] PSLRA was enacted to stem frivolous strike suits as well as preserve meritorious 
claims.”). 
 78 See Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. Fist Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 
U.S. 164 (1994) (rejecting aiding and abetting claims in private litigation); Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (setting forth a standard for 
properly pleading loss causation); Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) 
(requiring claims of fraud to be pled with  more specificity than required by Rule 8 of the 
FRCP); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007) (holding that 
plaintiffs must plead scienter particularly and those facts must give rise to a powerful or 
compelling inference of fraudulent intent); Stoneridge Investment Partners, L.L.C. v. 
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (rejecting plaintiff’s claim of scheme 
liability absent proof of actual reliance on the representations of indirect parties). The 
PSLRA actually provides for particularized discovery in certain circumstances, thus the 
proposed pleading standard does not disturb the discretion already provided to the courts 
by Congress. 15 USCS § 78u-4(b)(3)(B). (“[A]ll discovery and other proceedings shall be 
stayed during the pendency of any motion to dismiss, unless the court finds upon the 
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showing of scienter necessary to survive a motion to dismiss, the 
implementation of Tellabs in subprime-related litigation reveals 
distinguishable disparities in its application.79 
 
IV. MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES – PASSING THE RISK, KEEPING THE 
BUCK 
A. Mortgage-Backed Securities 
Mortgage-backed securities are debt obligations that derive their 
cash flows from pools of mortgages.80  The securities represent claims to 
the collective principal and interest payments made by the borrowers into 
the mortgage pool.81 The repackaging of mortgages into securities is also 
known as asset securitization or structured finance.82  These securities are 
customarily defined as mortgage-backed securities, but often mortgages 
make up many of the other asset-backed security classifications.83 
Investors in mortgage-backed securities evaluate risk primarily based on 
whether the issuer is private or government-backed, the quality of the 
underlying mortgage loans, and the credit enhancement or credit ratings 
afforded to the securities.84   
                                                                                                             
motion of any party that particularized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or to 
prevent undue prejudice to that party.”) (emphasis added). 
 79 See, e.g., Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 710 (7th Cir. 
2008) (Tellabs II) (holding that it was “possible to draw a strong inference of corporate 
scienter without being able to name the individuals who concocted and disseminated the 
fraud.”); cf. Tripp, et al. v. Indymac Financial Inc. et al., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95445 at 
*8–9 (C.D.C.A. 2007) (stating that the plaintiff confidential witnesses proffered no 
evidence indicating the individual defendants actual knowledge of the undisclosed 
financial risks). 
80 Mortgage-Backed Securities, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (last 
modified Jun. 25, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm. 
81  Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 The entities issuing mortgage-backed securities or other asset-backed securities are 
referred to as Special Purpose Vehicles (“SVPs”). Generally, these securities fall into 
three categories: (1) MBS (mortgage-backed securities); (2) ABS (asset-backed 
securities); or CDO (collaterized debt obligation). CDO payments are backed by mixed 
pools of mortgage loans and other types of receivables that the SVP owns. ABS CDOs 
represent an even more complex financial instrument, deriving payments from “a mixed 
pool of ABS and/or MBS securities.” Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: 
Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 376–79 (2008) 
(“CDO securities are backed by - and thus their payment derives principally or entirely 
from - a mixed pool of mortgage loans and/or other receivables . . . .”). 
 84 SEC Staff Report of the Task Force on Mortgage-Backed Securities Disclosure, 
Enhancing Disclosure in the Mortgage-Backed Securities Markets, at Part II.A (Jan. 
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/mortgagebacked.htm. 
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The majority of mortgage-backed securities are issued or 
guaranteed by two government-sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”), Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, and one government-owned entity, Ginnie Mae.85 
The government intervened in the secondary market of mortgage 
financing to facilitate broader lending practices by providing increased 
liquidity to mortgage lenders.86 Congress statutorily created Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae to enable mortgage lenders and originators 
to sell their mortgage loans, thus providing lenders with the increased 
capital necessary to finance more lending.87 The GSEs then pooled the 
purchased home mortgages and issued securities backed by the loan 
repayments, allowing the capital markets to invest in and promote home 
ownership at a low cost.88  Seeking to capitalize on the potential benefits 
of pooling home mortgages, private financial institutions also began to 
develop innovative mortgage-based investment vehicles.89   
Mortgage-backed securities issued by government agencies receive 
a “full faith and credit” backing from the U.S. government.90 Private 
financial institutions, however, also securitize and issue what are known 
as “private label” mortgage securities and must provide investors with 
their own guarantees.91 Initially, privately sponsored mortgage-backed 
securities presented great uncertainty and could not compete with the 
assurances provided by government-back securities.92 Wall Street reacted 
by investing millions of dollars in the development of effective pricing 
models to estimate the value of their mortgage pools.93 Ultimately, 
research analysts successfully developed models that provided investors 
with confidence.94 
The first generation of mortgage-backed securities simply 
facilitated a “pass through” of the borrowers’ repayments directly to the 
pool’s investors, offering each investor only partial ownership in the 
income streams.95 Investment bankers then began to divide different 
income streams from the same pool of securities according to the risk 




88 Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 
2199 (2007). 
 89 Id. at 2199–200. 
 90 See Mortgage-Backed Securities, supra note 80. 
 91 Id. 
92 See Peterson, supra note 88, at 2201–02. 
93 Id. at 2201. 
94 Id.  
95 Id. at 2202. 
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preferences of the investors, setting the stage for increased innovation 
and complexity in the market of mortgage-back securities.96  
B. The Infusion of Innovation and Subprime Mortgages 
Modern mortgage-related financial structures present inherent 
mathematical and financial complexities.97 Their complexities are 
propounded by the different credit ratings attributable to divided classes 
of mortgage-backed securities, known as “tranches.”98 Each tranch 
receives a grade, from “senior,” which is least likely to be impacted by 
default, to “mezzanine,” or “junior,” with the most junior tranch 
representing the highest degree of risk.99  As reflected by the current 
financial crisis, these different tranches did not earn a rating purely on 
the risk or value of the underlying asset, but often based on the degree of 
“protection” purchased by the seller.100  In other words, any quality of 
receivable could be made into a Triple-A, gold star rating, with the right 
credit enhancements.101 Although insured tranches would often earn 
Triple-A ratings, many of the insurers turned out to have very little 
capital in the event of a default.102 
The ambiguity of the investment risk and the likely conflicts of 
interest between the credit rating agencies103 and the financial institutions 
                                                                                                             
96 Id. at 2203 (“[O]ne security might entitle an investor to receive all the interest 
income - an ‘interest-only” tranche’ . . .  while another security might entitle investors to 
receive all payment toward loan principle - a ‘principle only tranche.’”). 
 97 Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman of the Committee of Oversight and 
Government Reform, stated that collateralized debt obligations represented “new 
financial inventions [that] were so complex that virtually no one really understood them.” 
Committee Holds Hearing on the Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial Crisis (Oct. 
22, 2008) available at http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=2255. 
98 See Peterson, supra note 88, at 2203. 
99 Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and Economics of Subprime 
Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 8 (2009). 
 100 Private-label investors sought additional assurances that the investment would pay 
out. Rating agencies provided this extra assurance, by researching the risk of the 
investments and issuing a credit rating pursuant to that diligence. In order to earn an 
“investment grade” rating, credit rating agencies often require “credit enhancements.” Id. 
 101 Subordination and collateralization are the most common means pooled receivable 
earn Triple-A ratings. Subordination refers to an investor agreement to purchase different 
degrees of risk exposure, commensurate with return, by investing in various tranches. 
Over-collateralization is when the pool is owed more money than it needs to pay it. See 
generally Unterman, supra note 75, at 61–64. 
 102 Id. (arguing that credit enhancements often came in the form of bond insurance 
and, unlike traditional insurance carriers, are not required by law to keep capital 
reserves). 
 103 See generally Emily Donahue, SEC Report and Recent Class Action Spell Trouble 
for Rating Agencies, 27-8 ABIJ 12 (October 2008) (analyzing the SEC report on the 
credit rating agencies “following a dramatic increase in delinquency rates for subprime 
mortgages that raised doubts about the accuracy of ratings issued for subprime residential 
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seeking to sell or resell these mortgage-backed securities caused many 
sophisticated investors to make poor investment decisions.104 Financial 
institutions marketed mortgage-backed securities as “stable instruments 
insulated from the risks of a housing downturn . . .  fooling investors to 
believe that bad loans could be transformed through the sophistication of 
the investment industry.”105 However, these “bad” or subprime loans 
revealed themselves as anything but safe.106 
Many issuers of mortgage-backed securities likely made meticulous 
disclosures of the investment risk, adequately disclosed the 
characteristics of the pool of underlying mortgages, and provided 
investors with an accurate depiction of the underwriting standards. 
Plaintiff investors, however, may assert that the issuer materially omitted 
trends in the deteriorating quality of the loans or claim that the issuer 
made inadequate disclosures of the consequences of a decline in the 
housing market.107 The complexity of the financial products does not 
automatically translate into inadequate disclosure or fraud, but plaintiffs 
in securities fraud class actions should get a presumption of inadequacy 
at the pleading stage in light of the financial instruments at issue.108 
                                                                                                             
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and the integrity of the ratings process in general”); 
see also, Steven Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lesson from the Subprime 
Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 401 (2008) (stating that “[r]ating agencies 
are customarily paid by the issuer of securities, but investors rely heavily on their 
ratings.”) (emphasis added). 
 104 See Schwarcz, supra note 103, at 401 (stating that “the conflict would have been 
more material than normal because ratings were given to numerable issuances of CDO 
and ABS CDO securities, with each issuance and rating earning a separate fee”); see also 
id. at 385 (“[S]ophisticated investors and qualified institutional buyers (QIBs) are the 
very investors who lost the most money in the subprime financial crisis.”). 
 105 See Aaron Unterman, Exporting Risk: Global Implications of the Securitization of 
U.S. Housing Debt, 4 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 77, 87 (2008). 
 106 Mortgage-pools increasingly became dominated by subprime mortgages. Subprime 
lending had originally provided borrower’s with low credit the opportunity to buy a home 
provided they posted additional collateral and paid a higher interest rate. More recently, 
as the demand for mortgage products grew, the underwriting standards of subprime 
mortgages deteriorated, with originators issuing mortgages with little substantiation of 
the borrower’s ability to repay. See Stuart R. Berkowitz, The Subprime Mortgage Mess - 
A Primer to Assist Investors, 64 J. MO. B. 122, 123 (2008).  
 107 For example, many issuers disclosed the fact that they reserved the right to allow 
for exceptions to underwriting criteria, yet never indicated the increasing rate of such 
exceptions. See Mark Adelson & David Jacob, ABS/MBS Litigation Outlook, ASSET 
SECURITIZATION REPORT (November 19, 2007), available at http://www.adelsonandjacob. 
com/pubs/Litigation_Outlook.pdf (citing empirical evidence that cumulative default rates 
of securitized loans gradually increased over time). 
 108 See infra Part IV.C. 
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C. Why These Plaintiffs are Different 
Disclosure represents the bedrock principle of United States 
securities laws.109 The adequacy of disclosure should not turn on the 
volume of information provided by an issuer or the number of times an 
investor reads a prospectus, but rather on whether investors can make 
meaningful investment decisions based on such disclosures.110 Billions of 
dollars are spent every year on corporate compliance with mandatory 
financial disclosures, but if these disclosures cannot adequately convey 
investment risks to market participants, the stock prices cannot 
accurately reflect the value of the investment.111 The premise that 
mandatory disclosures act to “disinfect” or prevent fraudulent securities 
practices has not stood the test of time; disclosure is simply not 
translating into efficient or prudent securities transactions.112 If securities 
regulation and securities issuers failed investors in the context of 
mortgage-backed securities, the very same securities laws providing 
private rights of action should not unreasonably restrict investors’ 
relief.113 
An increasing number of securities lawsuits filed by mortgage-
backed securities investors take aim at financial institutions.114 The non-
exhaustive list of issuers named as defendants include Credit Suisse, 
HSBC, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, Washington Mutual, 
                                                                                                             
 109 See Jonathan R. Macey, Hodge O’Neal Corporate and Securities Law 
Symposium: After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: The Future Disclosure System: A Pox On 
Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate Concerning the Relative 
Efficacy of Mandatory versus Enabling Rules, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 329, 330 (2003). 
 110 Id. (“The Enron collapse demonstrates . . . that disclosure . . . is useful only if 
market mechanisms are in place that are capable of observing and interpreting the 
information . . . .”). An example of such ineffectual disclosure can be found amidst the 
Enron scandal which represented fraud masked by the complexities of innovative 
financial structuring. See Bethany McLean, Why Enron Went Bust, FORTUNE, Dec. 21, 
2001 (quoting Congressman John Dingell) (“What we’re looking at here is an example of 
superbly complex financial reports. They didn’t have to lie. All they had to do was to 
obfuscate it with sheer complexity . . . .”), available at http://faculty.msb.edu/homak/ 
homahelpsite/webhelp/Enron_Why_It_Went_Bust_Fortune_12-24-01.htm. 
 111 See Macey, supra note 109, at 334. 
 112 Id. at 349 (stating that it is an improper assumption “that sophisticated traders can 
decode opaque, complicated, or obscure financial reporting” and “[t]his, in turn, creates a 
significant hole in the theory of market efficiency.”). 
 113 Id. at 349–50. (Allowing issuer defendants to introduced inadequate disclosures 
into the marketplace and imposing the PSLRA pleading standard on investors does not 
“promote true objectivity among outside monitors and towards generating better and 
more accurate information for internal monitors.”).  
 114 Faten Sabry, Anmol Sinha & Sungi Lee, The Snowball Effect, A Brief Review of 
Subprime Securities Litigation (May 2008), available at http://www.mmc.com/know 
ledgecenter/viewpoint/A_Brief_Review_of_Subprime_Securities_Litigation.pdf. 
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Bear Stearns, UBS, Morgan Stanley, and Bank of America.115 Investor-
plaintiffs bringing securities fraud class actions against financial 
institutions should be entitled to a relaxed pleading standard under the 
PSLRA because of the very nature of mortgage-backed securities. 
Disclosures made by issuers were inherently inadequate such that even 
the most sophisticated investors were unaware of the risky mortgages 
and the often undercapitalized insurance that supported the high grades 
of the investments.116 Further, many of the subprime mortgage 
originators were not affiliated with any bank and therefore were outside 
the scope of federal regulation.117 Thereafter, investment banks created 
these complex debt obligations and sold them to the investing public as 
safe investments. 
Arguably, not every prospectus can adequately portray the true 
risks of an investment, but this is not the only trouble with mortgage-
backed securities.118 In traditional securities transactions, it is assumed 
that the issuing company’s interests are aligned with that of its 
shareholders; if the company grows and succeeds, executives, employees 
and shareholders all stand to benefit. Mortgage originators, however, are 
often uninterested in the quality of their borrowers and more concerned 
with the commission paid on the loan.119 The originators have the luxury 
of passing the risk of loss on a mortgage by selling the right to repayment 
to the entities that pool mortgages and issue mortgage-backed 
securities.120 Additionally, the investment bankers responsible for the 
creation of the complex financial products only stood to gain on the 
performance of the fund, while their employers bore the risk of loss.121 
                                                                                                             
 115 See id. at 105. 
 116 See Exporting Risk, supra note 105, at 82 (arguing that “[t]he complexity of CDOs 
mask and misrepresent risk transfers through an opaque grading system which combines 
investment pools with different risk exposures” and “[t]he complexity and lack of 
transparency of securitized assets has allowed investor ignorance to be manipulated for 
profit and this will likely be reflected in widespread securities litigation.”). 
 117 Alan S. Blinder, Six Fingers of Blame in the Mortgage Mess, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 
2007, § 3 (Business), available at http://www.nytimes.com (search “six fingers of 
blame”; then follow the “Six Fingers of Blame in the Mortgage Mess” hyperlink). 
 118 The prospectus in a typical offering of securities can be hundreds of pages long. 
See Schwarcz, supra note 103, at 383. 
 119 Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Usury Law Debate: The Road to Subprime “HEL” 
Was Paved with Good Congressional Intentions: Usury Deregulation and the Subprime 
Home Equity Market, 51 S.C. L. REV. 473, 552 (2000) (“[L]oans may even be issued to 
borrowers who have no ability to pay based on loan applications falsified by mortgage 
brokers or lender employees eager for high commissions.”). 
 120 See Schwarcz, supra note 103, at 384. 
 121 See Unterman, Exporting Risk, supra note 105, at 83–84. (“The fee structure 
associated with securitization allowed for investment bankers and credit rating agencies 
to convert the likelihood of future income from an investment into an immediate fee, thus 
they took on little risk of a failed investment.”). 
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The complexities of the financial products, insufficient disclosures, and 
the limited information available regarding the mortgage pools’ 
underlying assets creates an insurmountable hurdle for plaintiffs under a 
strict implementation of the PSLRA pleading standard. 
D. “Collective Scienter” and “Core Product” Approach to Pleading 
The proposed pleading standard invokes recent circuit court 
methodology in which the courts analyzed the pleadings with the factual 
circumstances or context of the securities purchases in mind. In Tellabs, 
the Supreme Court mandated the federal courts to consider the totality of 
the pleadings when comparing inferences of scienter and this holistic 
approach may seem favorable to plaintiff-investors.122 However, as 
discussed earlier, the context of the housing meltdown presents a 
difficult background against which to asses the defendants’ conduct.123 
Circuit courts have, in certain circumstances, eliminated or 
modified the specificity necessary for plaintiffs to establish scienter 
under the PSLRA.124 The Ninth Circuit recently held that “[v]ague or 
ambiguous allegations are now properly considered as a part of a holistic 
review when considering whether the complaint raises a strong inference 
of scienter.”125 In South Ferry v. Killinger, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that if, because of the nature of the 
information, it would be “absurd” to suggest management’s ignorance, 
such general assertions may give rise to a strong inference of scienter.126 
The court additionally held that general or vague allegations of scienter, 
supported by particularized allegations of defendants’ access to factual 
information within the company, may support a strong inference of 
scienter.127 
The Seventh Circuit recently held that allegations of an undisclosed 
problem with a “core” product can bolster a strong inference of 
                                                                                                             
 122 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007) (holding that 
the allegations must be considered collectively). 
 123 Tripp v. IndyMac Bancorp, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95445 at *10 (C.D. Cal. 
Nov. 29, 2007) (“However, an even stronger inference is that Defendants were simply 
unable to shield themselves . . . from the drastic change in the housing and mortgage 
markets.”). 
 124 See, e.g., South Ferry LP v. Killinger, 542 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2008). 
    125 Id. at 784. 
 126 Id. at 786. 
 127 Id. at 785 (citing Nursing Home Pension Fund, Local 144 v. Oracle Corp., 380 
F.3d 1226, 1231 (9th Cir. 2004)) (“[T]he plaintiffs had pleaded facts showing a strong 
inference of scienter because, among other things, the CEO of the defendant company 
was quoted as saying: ‘All of our information is on one database. We know exactly how 
much we have sold in the last hour around the world.’”).  
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scienter.128 In Makor Issues & Rights v. Tellabs (“Tellabs II”),129 the 
court aptly describes the competing inferences standard of the PSLRA 
scienter requirement, explaining that defendants generally seek to infer 
“that although the statements were false and material, their falsity was 
the result of innocent, or at worst careless, mistakes at the executive level 
. . . rather than an intent to deceive or a reckless indifference to whether 
the statements were misleading.”130 Although the plaintiffs could not 
specifically name those defendants that perpetrated the alleged fraud, the 
court found it difficult to believe that no senior executives had 
knowledge of the falsity of the statement made about core company 
products.131 The court found the depth and diversity of twenty-six 
confidential witnesses persuasive enough to permit drawing inferences 
from such testimonies.132 The defendants countered the allegations of 
motive and opportunity by arguing they did not profit from deceiving 
investors about product demand, but the court found that this argument 
confused expected results with realized ones.133 
Provided a plaintiff pleads with particularity inadequate, fraudulent, 
or misleading statements of investment risk and supports those 
allegations with all facts available to them prior to discovery, the 
defendants should be required to rebut those specific allegations. 
Defendants’ inability to effectively rebut allegations of 
misrepresentation, proper due diligence, or intent, should impute the 
alleged falsity and knowledge on the defendant at the pleading stage. For 
example, in South Ferry, the defendants could not rebut the presumption 
that information about the demand for a core product would be known by 
key executives, thus the court imputed the requisite knowledge.134 The 
proposed standard aligns with this presumption such that a defendant’s 
unsupported inference can never defeat a strong inference of scienter.135 
                                                                                                             
 128 Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Tellabs 
II”). 
 129 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007) (holding that 
the case be remanded to determine whether the plaintiffs established a strong inference of 
scienter). 
 130 Id. at 709. 
 131 Id. at 709–11 (“The plausibility of an explanation depends on the plausibility of 
the alternative explanations.”). 
 132 Id. at 712 (“[C]onfidential sources listed in the complaint in this case, in contrast, 
are numerous and consist of persons who from the description of their jobs were in a 
position to know at first hand the facts to which they are prepared to testify.”). 
 133 Id. at 710 (holding that “the benefits of concealment might exceed the costs” when 
executives withhold bad news with the hopes of future good news). 
 134 South Ferry LP v. Killinger, 542 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 135 Tellabs II, 513 F.3d at 710 (describing a scenario where the court could not ignore 
the theory of corporate scienter stating “[s]uppose General Motors announced that it had 
sold one million SUVs in 2006, and the actual number was zero” and holding that a 
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Compare a recent Second Circuit holding in Teamsters Local 445 
Freight Division v. Dynex Capital,136 where the court reversed the district 
court holding and found that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead 
scienter.137 The court mandated a dismissal of the securities fraud claim 
because the plaintiffs failed to prove a “strong inference that someone 
whose intent could be imputed to the corporation acted with the requisite 
scienter.”138 The court found the overall weakness in the market, rather 
than fraudulent activity, provided the strongest inference to be drawn 
from the poor performance of certain mortgage-backed securities.139 
In Dynex, the plaintiffs alleged that the corporate defendants 
misrepresented the quality of loans and the true value of the collateral 
underlying certain Dynex bonds.140 The proposed pleading standard 
would require the defendants to counter such allegations with proof of 
due diligence and appropriate disclosures concerning the very complex 
and very risky underwriting standards backing their mortgage-based 
securities.  The Second Circuit’s interpretation of the PSLRA’s scienter 
requirement insulates and even provides corporate executives with a 
roadmap of conduct that will keep them out of court. The recent 
approaches of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, although not fully 
embracing a product-oriented analysis, rationalize the necessity to relax 
the strict pleading requirements of the PSLRA when the context of the 
fraud so requires. In the context of the current financial crisis, the 
toxicity of the packaged subprime loans, the undisclosed associated risks 
of default, and the exorbitant fees earned by the originators and 
investment bankers provides such a context. 
                                                                                                             
plaintiff may raise a strong inference of “corporate scienter without being able to name 
the individuals who concocted and disseminated the fraud.”). 
 136 Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital, Inc., 531 F.3d 
190 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 137 Id.  The Dynex case presents a circumstance where the court is asked to impute 
“corporate scienter” because the plaintiffs cannot specifically correlate the alleged 
misstatements made on behalf of the corporation with an individual defendant. Several 
circuits, including the Ninth, have been unwilling to impute such scienter on the 
corporate entity without specific proof of knowledge of the fraud on the part of individual 
corporate actors. See South Ferry LP v. Killinger, 542 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2008). 
However, many of those circuits have budged when the circumstantial evidence is such 
that the information must have been known to the corporate executives, and in the 
context of mortgage-backed securities, lax underwriting standards and the deteriorating 
value of the underlying collateral of a security, if sufficiently alleged, should provide 
such a circumstance. See generally Patricia S. Abril & Ann Morales Olazabal, The Locus 
of Corporate Scienter, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 81 (2006). 
 138 Id. at 197 (emphasis added). 
 139 Id.  
 140 Id. at 193 (“Teamsters alleges, the defendants ‘misrepresented the cause of the 
bond collateral’s poor performance; misrepresented the reasons for restating its loan loss 
reserves; and concealed the loans’ faulty underwriting.’”). 
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E. Solution - Product-Oriented Relaxation of the PSLRA 
The countless layers of transactions, coupled with the inherently 
complex nature of mortgage-backed securities calls for flexibility in 
evaluating pleadings in securities class actions. After defendant 
corporations freely structure destructive financial instruments, exercise 
zero due diligence concerning the value of the assets backing the 
securities, and purchase whatever credit ratings they desire, we cannot 
allow them to hide behind the PSLRA. Plaintiffs’ access to trial should 
not turn on the lack of direct evidence of intent, but rather on the strength 
of the circumstantial evidence evincing such intent. 
A starting point in the court’s analysis should be the context of the 
purchase of the mortgage-backed securities at issue.141 The most 
substantial risk involved with the purchase of mortgage-backed securities 
is the risk that the borrowers of the underlying loans will not provide 
timely repayments.142  Losses associated with the current financial crisis 
fall predominately on institutional investors, arguably the most 
sophisticated investors in the world.143  If institutional investors failed to 
interpret the risk properly, and institutional investors are the dominate 
class of investors in mortgage-backed securities, it can be inferred that 
those savvy investors were uninformed.144 Although inadequate 
disclosure is not the only inference to be drawn from such a context, it 
presents a “strong” enough inference to place financial institutions and 
investor-plaintiffs on the same footing at the pleading stage.145 
                                                                                                             
 141 The “context” will undoubtedly change as federal regulators and the public take 
aim at mortgage-backed securities. The “context” before the court will evolve as 
implementation of heightened disclosures are mandated in the arena of mortgage-backed 
securities or alternatively, the court likely would find that the risks associated with 
contemporaneous purchases of mortgage-backed securities are now well publicized. For 
examples of possible reforms in the disclosure of mortgage-backed securities, see Policy 
Statement on Financial Market Developments: The President’s Working Group on 
Financial Markets, 14 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 447, 450–51 (2008) (suggesting mandating 
oversight of institutional investors, disclosure of rating agency processes and practices, 
and reforming the mortgage origination process). 
 142 SEC Staff Report of the Task Force on Mortgage-Backed Securities Disclosure, 
Enhancing Disclosure in the Mortgage-Backed Securities Markets, Part II.C.5.b. (Jan. 
2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/mortgagebacked.htm. 
 143 Id. at Part II.B. 
 144 Former SEC Chairman, Arthur Levitt, once explained “[i]nformed investors, 
armed with accurate information, ensure market prices represent fair value.” Unterman, 
Innovative Destruction, supra note 8, at 86. 
 145 Recall that the Supreme Court held in Tellabs that the strong inference required to 
plead scienter need only be “strong in light of other explanations.” See supra note 57. 
Regardless of the circuits’ stance on the level of intent necessary to satisfy the scienter 
element (motive and opportunity, recklessness, or deliberate recklessness), a rebuttable 
presumption of intent provides plaintiffs and the courts with the opportunity to evaluate 
the merits of the plaintiffs’ allegations through the lenses of the defendants’ rebuttal. See 
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The product-oriented approach to the PSLRA pleading 
requirements also provides investors and the public with an avenue of 
meaningful deterrence.  The PSLRA serves as a check to deter frivolous 
litigation, maintaining the overarching goal of limiting the high costs of 
discovery and settlements on defendant-corporations.146 Although these 
costs may be high, the benefit of investor initiated class actions serves as 
a mechanism for the deterrence of corporate fraud, and this deterrent 
alleviates the need for burdensome and costly regulations.147 
V. CONCLUSION 
The current financial crisis stems from misaligned incentives, 
innovative and complex financial products, and greed.  The heightened 
pleading standard of the PSLRA cannot create an atmosphere of 
immunity for corporate actors in light of the far-reaching externalities 
presented by the current crisis.148 Although the SEC represents one of the 
principal mechanisms of fraud deterrence in the financial markets, it 
cannot adequately provide the security necessary to restore and maintain 
investor protection.149 The high expectations placed on Wall Street 
executives often foster illegal conduct or fraud, yet the PSLRA limits 
investors’ remedies to those instances when fraudulent activity is 
obvious and public.150  When the courts interpret the PSLRA pleading 
                                                                                                             
Michael R. Dube, Motive and Opportunity Test Survives Congressional Death Knell in 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 42 B.C. L. REV 619 (2001), for an extensive 
analysis of the circuit split regarding the requisite level of intent necessary to establish a 
strong inference of scienter. 
 146 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 147 Regulation often follows in the wake of a financial crisis. In response to the Enron, 
Tyco, and WorldCom scandals, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. For a 
discussion of the adverse impacts of Sarbanes-Oxley, see J. Brent Wilkins, The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002: The Ripple Effect of Restoring Shareholder Confidence, 29 S. ILL. U. 
L. J. 339, 341 (2005) (stating that as a result of the Sabanes-Oxley Act “mid-cap 
companies found that the cost of being public has almost doubled, from $ 1.3 million to 
almost $ 2.5 million.”). 
 148 Kevin S. Shmelzer, The Door Slammed Shut Needs to be Reopened: Examining he 
Pleading Requirements Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 78 TEMP. L. 
REV. 405, 425 (2005) (“[T]he PSLRA may have given too much comfort to corporate 
executives to the detriment of individual investors.”). 
 149 See, e.g., James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Public and Private Enforcement of 
the Securities Laws: Have Things Changed Since Enron?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 893, 
898 (2004) (summarizing the results of an empirical study finding that “SEC actions 
result in lower average (median) settlements, are brought against on average (but not 
median) smaller market capitalization companies, have shorter average (median) class 
periods, and take longer on average (median) to reach settlement.”). 
 150 See Shmelzer, supra note 147, at 415 (finding a “dichotomy in the pleading 
standards” when the plaintiff proves motive and opportunity of executive’s personal gain, 
but no “specific instances of deliberate recklessness.”). 
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standard too stringently, it furthers only one policy goal of the PSLRA: 
preventing the initiation of securities litigation.151  A pleading standard, 
seeking to deter frivolous lawsuits, should not turn on procedures or 
particularities.  The fact that the mere absence of direct proof of specific 
incidences of fraud mandates a dismissal of securities class actions sends 
a message to corporate executives that they may externalize any and all 
risk associated with risky investments, so long as they do so quietly.  The 
proposed standard prevents the dismissal of a meritorious claim merely 
because publicly disclosed evidence of fraud is hidden beneath layers of 
transactions and complex mathematical equations.152 
A product-oriented carve-out in the context of mortgage-backed 
securities embraces the policy goals of the PSLRA and requires 
defendants in class action lawsuits to rebut targeted allegations of fraud 
upon a motion to dismiss; avoiding the burdens and costs associated with 
blanket discovery requests.  Clarity in pleading standards carries special 
importance when plaintiffs are made up of municipalities, local and state 
governments, unions, and retirees, all seeking the recovery of billions of 
dollars.153  Studies reveal that the strength and effectiveness of investor 
remedies correlates with stronger stock markets.154  The strength of 
investor rights is “a key element of sound corporate governance” and 
“necessary components of an investor protection regime.”155  Because 
investor confidence drives the financial marketplace, the costs of 
litigation cannot outweigh the benefits to the public.156 The proposed 
standard, complemented by the PSLRA provisions directly addressing 
discovery concerns,157 provides for an even-handed approach to 
                                                                                                             
 151 Id. at 426 (concluding that Congress swung the pendulum too far in protecting 
defendants). 
 152 See Thomas, supra note 14, at 80 (“Investors need a mechanism to investigate 
potential securities fraud complaint where there is some evidence fraud has occurred.”). 
 153 See Cummings, supra note 33, at 1039 (finding that a variety of organizations and 
politicians warned that the PSLRA would deny local governments and municipalities 
recovery). 
 154 Steven A. Ramirez, The Special Interest Race to CEO Primacy and the End of 
Corporate Governance Law, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 345, 366 (2007) (citing a study of 49 
nations comparing financial development with strong investor remedies that found a low 
burden of proof deters self-dealing and promote financial markets). 
 155 Id. (“Investor protection is essential to securing the appropriate economic and 
financial operation of the public corporation.”). 
 156 See generally Wunderlich, supra note 43, at 669 (“[T]he risk posed by a standard 
resulting in the dismissal of meritorious suits is likewise paramount.”). 
 157 Id. at 666 (discussing that the PSLRA mandates Rule 11 sanction for the filing of 
baseless claims, in addition to the mandatory discovery stay provision). 
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evaluating the merits of a mortgage-backed securities claim, while still 
preserving the goals of private securities litigation.158 
 
                                                                                                             
 158 Keith Johnson, Deterrence of Corporate Fraud Through Securities Ltitigation: 
The Role of Institutional Investors, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 155, 155 (1997) (“The 
first is the goal of obtaining compensation for wronged investors who have suffered 
losses at the hands of corporate wrongdoers. The second is filling the role of private 
attorneys general to sanction violators and deter future misconduct.”). 
 
